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INSANITY AS A, DEFENSE IN THE
NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL LAW
DILLARD S. GARDNER*
From the manias and depressions of King Saul, the grass eating
degeneracy of Nebuchadnezzar, and the homicidal delusions of the Tro-
jan War hero, Ajax, down to the mentally warped killers and sex
criminals in the morning newspaper, man has tried to think sanely about
insanity, to apply reason to the understanding of the irrational. Here
is a fairly typical excerpt from a local newspaper: "Brinkley was first
arrested and charged with burglary when he was caught in a room in
Alexander Dormitory. He remained in Wake County jail without
privilege of bond until his first mental examination in which a Duke
University neuro-psychiatrist declared him insane. . . . The second
examination conducted [by the Veterans' Hospital, Richmond, Virginia]
into the veteran's facility [sic] declared him sane and competent to de-
fend himself in court."t Such cases present medical problems. They
are also legal problems. Most of all, they are social problems. We are
here concerned, primarily, with the legal problem.
Insanity: A Legal Term
It may surprise some to know that "insanity" is a legal, not a medi-
cal, term.' It has been criticized as a "heritage" in our language which
no longer serves a useful purpose.2 Such titles as Mental Disorder and
the Criminal Law (Glueck) and Criminal Responsibility (Mercier)
indicate an attempt to escape from a term which has become deeply
imbedded in our daily speech. "Insanity" is used in law and in every-
day speech to indicate the individual lack of social and legal responsi-
bility for conduct; it is not intended as a precise descriptive or diagnostic
symbol for use in psychiatric discussion.3 In dealing with the "insane,"
* Chairman of the North Carolina Bar Association's "Special Committee on
Crime and Psychiatry 1950-1951" and Marshal-Librarian of the North Carolina
Supreme Court.
t Raleigh Times, Jan. 9, 1951, p. 12.
Karpman, Criminality, Insanity and Law, 39 J. CRaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 584-
585 (1949). See SMoOT, LAW OF INSANITY (1929) c. 3. No medical authorities
are cited and the discussion is based almost exclusively on legal materials.
'In WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFNSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 12 (1933), the
author declares, "It would undoubtedly be best to eliminate the use of the word 'in-
sanity' altogether, and instead, to use words like 'mental disorder' when referring to
the medical concept of mental ill health per se, and other terms, clearly legal in their
implication, to describe the concepts which we have referred to as 'irresponsibility
.' and 'present insanity... "
3 GLUECI, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 12 (1925), discusses the
history of the word, pointing out how it was brought into law from medicine or
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the courts must think primarily of society, secondarily of the individual,
although there should be an awareness of the scientific findings concern-
ing the particular mental disorder. The psychiatrist has a different
problem; in approaching the patient as a psychotic needing individualized
treatment and care, he does not have to concern himself with the legal
theories and concepts of responsibility. In its legal aspects the problem
of responsibility touches one of the most baffling puzzles which has chal-
lenged men's minds through the ages, for it rests upon the ideas of
freedom of will, volition, and human personality. "The law of insanity"
is the joint field of law and medicine, but in this joint undertakingi law
is the senior partner and the primary, if not the final, responsibility
rests with law, not medicine.
Functions of Law and of Medicine
It is always important, where the question of sanity is under adjudi-
cation, to keep clearly in mind the proper division of function between
law and medicine, between court and doctor. The proper function of
the medical witness is to describe the mental condition of the person
under consideration, and to point out wherein and to what extent the
particular mentality is subnormal with reference to an adequate or rea-
sonably adequate adjustment to his environment.4 At this point, the
some other field at an early date, was pre-empted by law, then was disowned by
medicine to the extent that it is no longer treated as a medical term. The looseness
with which the term is used is indicated by MALOY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAW-
YEas (2d ed. 1951), where many synonyms of broad, general meaning are given.
See also OVERHOLSER & RICHMOND, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 9, 164 (1947);
WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRImiNAL LAW 11 (1933).
'"The most fruitful source of error and confusion in this field of law is traceable
to the requirement that the expert say categorically whether or not the hypothetical
person (whom everybody knows to be the defendant on trial) did or did not know
right from wrong. This question is purely within the province of the jury, who
must answer it as they must any other matter of questionable fact; all the expert
should be asked to do, and all his training qualifies him to do, is to pass judgment,
not upon the ethicolegal question of right and wrong, but upon the medical question
of whether or noe the defendant was mentally unsound, a question that his peculiar
training and experience, and his study of the individual offender's case, entitles him
to answer. Once he has given the facts as he finds them, as to mental unsoundness
(i.e. his opinion as to sanity or insanity and the type and degree of the latter), the
second question, that of irresponsibility, is one that the jury must decide, with the
aid of such legal devices as tests applied to the fact of insanity." GLUECK, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 309. Dr. Zilboorg states this view even more strongly from the
viewpoint of the medical witness: "To force a psychiatrist to talk in terms of the
ability to distinguish between right and wrong and of legal responsibility is-let
us admit it openly and frankly-to force him to violate the Hippocratic Oath, even
to violate the oath he takes as a witness to tell the truth and nothing but the truth,
to force him to perjure himself for the sake of justice. For what is it, if not per-
jury, if a clinician speaks of right and wrong, and criminal responsibility, and the
nature and quality of the criminal act committed, when he, the psychiatrist, really
knows absolutely nothing about such things, when they are presented to him in
terms of a hypothetical question, based on legal assumptions and hypothetical psy-.
chiatry. He may think he knows something about these things, but this, his assumed
knowledge, would then be his not by virtue of his being a clinical psychiatrist, or
1951]
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judge (or the judge and jury) takes over the determination. Weighing
what the medical testimony has developed, the judge (or judge and
jury) measures the mental adequacy of the subject against the legal
test for sanity and decides whether or not the intelligence, judgment,
and general mental attainments of the individual are sufficiently high
to demand that he be held to the requirements of thought and conduct
required of normal men generally. The question for the doctor is the
medical question of mental unsoundness, its character and extent; once
that has been presented, the judge (or judge and jury) decides whether
the particular mental unsoundness is sufficiently severe to result in legal
irresponsibility. The doctor's province is that of medical fact; the in-
ference from those facts, under the appropriate legal tests, is the function
of the jury and constitutes the determination of the question of legal
responsibility. The doctor says the person is mentally unsound; the
jury goes further and says that mental unsoundness is of such a degree
that he is freed from legal responsibility for his acts. The point at which
the factual problem of the doctor becomes the adjudicating problem of
the jury is the point of stress in society's system for handling the crim-
inally insane.
Criticism of the Medical Function
judges, lawyers, and, to a large extent, laymen tend to discount
medical and psychiatric opinion. Often, as in the newspaper reference
above, medical men arrive at directly opposite conclusions, and the lay
witness treats them as canceling each other, largely disregarding both.
Then, too, normal egotism makes nearly everyone feel that he can "tell
when somebody is crazy" as well as any expert, the feeling that psy-
chiatry is "an elaborate statement of what everybody knows in language
that nobody can understand." Furthermore, involved psychiatric theory
with its highly technical language is so foreign to the experience of the
common man that he is inclined to look upon the psychiatrist as a glori-
fied medicine man rather than a medical scientist. Too, there is some-
times the tendency on the part of experts generally (and psychiatrists
are no exceptions) to deliver their opinions with the defiant dogmatism
of revealed fact, thus arousing the natural resentment bestowed upon
those who assume to speak as absolute and final authorities. Coupled
with this is the usual reluctance or inability of the psychiatrist to be
persuasive, to announce his findings convincingly in understandable
terms for the uninitiated, with the result that the man-of-the-street tends
a psychiatric expert, but only by virtue of his assuming the role of an amateur
lawyer" The Reciprocal Responsibilities of Law and Psychiatry, 54 CASE AND
COM M NT 8, 14 (Nov.-Dec. 1949). See also note 6 infra.
[Vol. so
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to disregard the psychiatrist and to fall back upon his own "common
sense" judgment of the sanity or insanity of the individual.
41
Criticism of the Legal Function
There is a substantial body of opinion, particularly from medical
men, criticizing the law's disposition of the insane. From the psychia-
trist's point of view, there is a feeling on his part that, as a trained and
experienced specialist in a very abstruse subject, his findings and con-
clusions should be accepted without question. He knows that time will
not permit him to conduct for the court a course in abnormal psychology
and advanced psychiatry which will permit laymen to follow, in ddtail,
his findings and conclusions; with pardonable professional pride, he sees
no reason for such necessity, thus overlooking the fact that most laymen
have become accustomed to the acceptance of the findings of general
practitioners but few have ever had dealings with psychiatrists or know
much of the mystery of the human mind. Against this background,
astute cross-examiners, by the simple process of withdrawing or adding
symptoms in their questions, usually find it relatively easy to discredit,
in part at least, the conclusions of the psychiatrist.
Too, the psychiatrist is justifiably critical of legal language and con-
cepts, regarding them as incorporating obsolete and often discredited
medical theories relating to the mind. For example, the notion that
intelligence may be separated from the volitional and emotional life of
an individual appears absurd and fantastic to most scientists, but appears
to be taken for granted in legal theory. This is but symptomatic of the
wide gulf separating psychiatric and legal theory. Most psychiatrists,
as trained medical men, regard society's (law's) entire procedure in diag-
nosing, treating and detaining the insane as thoroughly unscientific,
crude and inadequate. 5  Added to all this, at times the judge and the
lawyers in their technical application of the rules of evidence appear to
the psychiatrist to be in a conspiracy to prevent him from telling the jury
that he has found the person under consideration to be irresponsibly
insane. 6
" The selection, and payment, of experts by the parties-with resulting bias and
conflict-has been sharply condemned. See Note, 36 HARv. L. REV. 333 (1923);
White, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings Involving the Question of the
Mental State of the Defendant, 11 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINoLOGY 499 (1921) ; GLUEcK,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 34. Its result in practice is to discredit thoroughly the
conflicting experts. Note, 9 MicH. L. REv. 603 (1911).
' Many, if not most, criminal psychopathologists regard all criminals as "men-
tally sick" and fit subjects of treatment rather than of incarceration. Dr. Benjamin
Karpman, of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C., has often vigorously
and ably presented this view. See Karpman, supra note 1, at 584 and Karpman,
An Attempt at a Re-evaluation of Some Conwepts of Law and Psychiatry, 38 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 206 (1947), the latter insisting upon an extensive re-
appraisal of the right-from-wrong theory as the basis of criminal punishment.
0 The proper scope of the medical expert's testimony is this: He may tell the,
symptoms of the particular mental disorder of diagnosis, which of them apply to
1951]
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Doctors are often critical of the hypothetical question, but it is the
only device available which will present to the jury after the evezt but
before the facts are adjudicated the doctor's opinion of 'defendant's men-
tal condition at the time of the event. By giving his opinion based on
different sets of evidentiary facts, once the jury has found one of those
sets of facts to be true, the doctor's opinion aids it in adjudicating the
ultimate fact, i.e., whether defendant was legally responsible (not whether
he was-mentally disordered). 7 The use of partisan and biased experts,
privately employed to testify for one side, tends to discredit expert
testimony. Much could be done to improve this condition if the trial
judge would (after consultation with the lawyers to secure agreement
if possible) appoint experts to be called by the court and paid by the
parties jointly (or by the county of trial),8 The present right-from-
wrong test of insanity is too narrow for scientific accuracy. We now
punish all who know right from wrong, when we should punish only
those who, knowing right from wrong, voluntarily do the wrong, having
the power to choose the right. Many insane people, some institutional-
ized, know right from wrong, but lack the volition and control to reflect
it in conduct. A broadening of the present test would give a more fair,
humane and scientifically accurate test, and can be accomplished without
legislation. 9
the person under consideration as well as their weight in diagnosis, and the com-
bination of symptoms and circumstances which would amount to proof of the men-
tal disorder. Schultz, The Role of Medical Science in the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice, 23 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 736, 742 (1933). Generally, the expert
is not permitted to state that the subject is insane or that he does not know right
from wrong, as this is the question at issue and is for the jury to decide. Roams,
ExPERT TESTIMONY 439 (3d ed. 1941). However, in North Carolina, experts have
been allowed more latitude; for example, a doctor has been permitted to testify
that a defendant was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. State
v. Vernon, 208 N. C. 340, 342, 180 S. E. 590, 591 (1935). See "Evidence of Mental
Incapacity," infra.
7 Briggs, Medico-Legal Insanity and the Hypothetical Question, 14 J. CRIm. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 62 (1923) ; White, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings In-
volving the Question of the Mental State of the Defendant, 11 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 499 (1921); GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 29-36; Lind, Cross
Examination of Alienists, 13 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 228 (1922). THE UNi-
FORM EXPERT TESTIMONY Acr would vastly improve this condition.
SWhite, supra note 7; Notes, 36 HARv. L. REV. 333 (1923), 9 MIcH. L. REV.
603 (1911). The fullest use of the suggestion made as to pay and appointment of
experts would perhaps require enabling legislation in North Carolina, but the
implied and inherent powers of the court would permit much of this to be accom-
plished without new statutes. For a discussion of the excellent Mass. Brigg's Law
in eliminating partisan experts, see Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of the Experts
in Criminal Insanity, 48 MICH. L. REV. 961 (1950).
' See note 7 supra; BULKNELL & TUKES, PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE 269 (3d
ed. 1874) ; Meagher, Crime and Insanity: The Legal Opposed to the Medical View,
and the Most Commonly Asserted Pleas, 14 J. Caim. L. & CRIMrINOLOGY 46 (1923)
Note, 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 167 (1924) (citing both legal and medical authorities);
Dr. W. T. Williamson, representing the Oregon State Medical Association, The In-
sanity Defense, 1 ORF. L. REv. 100 (1922). The criticism expressed is well pre-
sented by Somerville, J., in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887), a state-
[Vol. 30
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Insanity: Historical Introduction
The concept of insanity has changed through the ages. It was first
regarded as a pact with the devil, a sin, and as a sin it soon came to be
regarded as a crime. 10 Much later it was treated as a defense to crime.."
Today, it is considered not only a defense to, but also a cause of, crime.
12
Insanity for ages was the joint province of priests, philosophers, and doc-
tors. Gradually, medicine absorbed the subject and contributed its
concepts to the law. Today, as we have already noted, insanity is
largely the joint problem of law and medicine.
In the early fourteenth century, English law first began to recognize
the mitigating effect of insanity.13 In the sixteenth century rules were
developed for determining legal insanity.14 By the eighteenth century
the basis for the modern rules had been laid.15 In 1843 M'Naghten's
Case 10 was decided; the rule in that English case-the test of legal
insanity is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong-is the
fundamental expression of the law of insanity as a defense to crime in
both England and America today.17 Twelve years after M'Naghten's
Case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, faced for the first time
with the necessity for adopting a test of criminal insanity, accepted the
meat which Dean Henry W. Ballentine, in the next article cited, characterized as
"probably the best exposition of the subject in the books." Dean Ballentine himself
ably criticizes the present rule in Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble-
minded, 9 J. CRIM. L. & CRImINoIoGY 485 (1919), where he establishes this thesis:
"Crime does not exist unless the actor can be regarded as morally responsible for
his act." Chief Justice Stacy came quite close to the same view in State v. Harris,
223 N. C. 697, 704, 28 S. E. 2d 232, 238 (1943), where he says that if the de-
fendant did not know he was doing what was wrong "the law does not hold him
accountable for his acts, for guilt arises from volition, and not from a diseased
mind." [Italics added.] For an excellent recent discussion, see Aschaffenburg,
Psychiatry and the Crininal Law, 32 J. Cane. L. & CRImINOLoGY 2 (1941).
"oHart, PSYCHOLOGY OF INSANITY 2-4 (3d ed. 1929) ; MAUDSLEY, R.FsPONSI-
nILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE (1874); JACOBY, THE UNSOUND MIND AND THE LAW(1918).(1 It was recognized as an excuse for crime during the reign of Edward I (1272-
1307) and during the reign of Edward III (1326-1327). 3 HOLDSwORTH, A His-
TORY or ENGLISH LAW 371 (3d ed. rewritten 1923).
HOAG & WILLIAMS, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS AND THE LAW 19 (1923).
" 3 HoLnswoRa, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371 (3d ed. rewritten 1923).
"GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131; WHARTON & STILLE, MEDICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE 513-517 (3d ed. 1873).
' HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN Book 1, p. 2 (8th ed. 1824).
10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
222 C. J. S. 124 (1940). "Ever since the McNaghten formula was adopted,
attempts have been made to change it. But all courts of last resort have come
back to the rule. This is not due to any mystic reverence for 19th Century
law. It is due to the fact that after all the oratory has evaporated, one stark fact
remains. Unless a man is held answerable for doing what he knows he should not
do, there will be no enforceable sanction against criminal behavior. Even very
psychotic patients can be influenced by fears, hopes and promises. . . . And it is
not unreasonable to hold even a lunatic accountable for doing something that he
really knows is wrong. They do it every day in mental hospitals." Davidson,
The Psychiatrist's Role in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 4 RUTGERS L.
Rxv. 578, 587 (1950).
1951]
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right-from-wrong test of M'Naghten's Case.'8  This test is still applied
in North Carolina. 19
Meaning of Right-from-Wrong Test
What does our court mean by the "capacity to distinguish between
right and wrong"? Does it mean moral or legal wrong? Does it mean
wrong in a general, abstract sense or with reference to the specific act
and offense charged? The test is sometimes said to be the capacity to
"understand the nature and consequences of the act." Do the words
"nature" and "consequences" refer to the moral, the social, the physical,
the individual, or the legal "consequences"?
In the first case in this State, mentioned above, the trial judge told
the jury that the test was whether the defendant was "sufficiently
rational to distinguish right from wrong, and to know that what he was
doing was in violation of the laws of God and man"; and, the supreme
court, after saying that he "lays down the doctrine more strongly" than
the old textbooks, approved the charge. It would probably be approved
today. Certainly, since this case, the court has again and again said that
if the individual, at the time of the offense, knew the nature and con-
sequences of his act and was conscious that he was doing wrong, he was
sane; if not, he was insane.20 The charge must be at least this favorable
to the defendant; it may be as much more favorable to the defendant
as the trial judge cares to make it, since the State cannot appeal from an
acquittal. This means-as able trial lawyers have long recognized-
that if the judge charges more favorably for the defendant than the law
requires (as, for example, if he tells the jury that "temporary, emotional
insanity" or "irresistible impulse" are defenses to crime), the jury will
often acquit a defendant who would have been convicted before a more
severe and more accurate judge. The practical result is that the trial
judge has a wide latitude in giving to the jury a more lenient test of
insanity than the right-from-wrong test, but he will be reversed on
appeal it he gives a test which the supreme court considers more harsh
than the standard test.
It will be noted that the portion of the test referring to defendant's
"' State v. Sewell, 48 N. C. 245 (1855), emphasized the understanding of "moral"
right as the basis of responsibility. Earlier, in State v. John, 30 N. C. 330
(1848), a homicide involving drunkenness, raised the problem, but did not sug-
gest a comprehensive test of insanity. State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463 (1861),
is actually our first case clearly stating the M'NIaghtem rule, although the classic
formulation of the North Carolina rule begins with State v. Haywood, 61 N. C.
376 (1867).
"' State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 28 S. E. 2d 232 (1943) ; State v. Mathews,
226 N. C. 639, 39 S. E. 2d 819 (1946) ; State v. Swink, 229 N. C. 123, 47 S. E. 2d
852 (1948).
-' For an extended charge on the subject reflecting an Irish stew of many cases,
see State v. Bracy, 215 N. C. 248, 18 S. E. 2d 891 (1939).
[Vol. 30
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consciousness of "doing wrong" has a strong moral tone. In one case
the test used was distinguishing "good and evil," 21 and in another it
was said that he must be "under a visitation of God" so as not to be
able to "distinguish between good and evil."
'22 But for later adjudica-
tions to the contrary, we would assume from these intimations that the
"wrong" to be tested is "wrong" in a general and abstract sense. The
test does not involve the understanding of abstract wrong, but only. the
"wrong" of the particular and specific act.2 3
Having settled that it is the "wrong" of the particular act which is
to be considered, we still have the question whether it is moral or legal
wrong that is the test. There are loose expressions in the cases24 which
might support the view that "legal" wrong is involved, but our court,
in sustaining a charge that the test is whether he knew "what he was
doing was in violation of the laws of God and man," declared that the
test refers to "moral right and wrong."
2 5
The words "nature," "quality" and "consequences" with relation
to the act have not been amplified in the cases, but are treated as merely
another form of stating the right-from-wrong rule, and do not intend
to add further elements to the test. Sometimes the test is said to be
"the capacity to -distinguish right from wrong with respect to the spe-
cific act," at other times it is given as "the capacity to know the nature
and quality of the act," but, perhaps even more often, both of these
tests are given alternatively as but two ways of stating the same test;
certainly, the two forms of stating the test have been treated as legally
synonymous.
2 6
" State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72 (1913).
22 State v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 376 (1867).
2" State v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 23 S. E. 2d 885 (1943). This decision must
be taken as modifying and correcting the view of State v. Cooper, 170 N. C. 719,
87 S. E. 50 (1915), where the test given was the capacity to distinguish between
right and wrong either generally or with reference to the particular crime. The
Hairston Case follows the view of M'Naghten's Case-that the "wrong" referred
to is the "wrong" of the act charged, not "wrong" generally or in the abstract.
WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A D=rNSE IN CRimiNAL LAw 28 (1933).
"'In State v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 376 (1867), it was said that the test was
whether the prisoner comprehended the "criminal character" of his act. In a recent
case a charge was approved which said that if the prisoner understood the "criminal
character" of the act and knew it to be "unlawful," he was legally sane. State v.
Bracy, 215 N. C. 248, 1 S. E. 2d 891 (1939). See State v. Hammonds, 216 N. C.
67, 3 S. E. 2d 439 (1939).
-" State v. Sewell, 48 N. C. 245 (1855), is our first case following M'Naghten's
rule. The opinion does not cite M'Naghtees Case, although the trial judge ap-
pears to have followed it. Cardozo, J., also took this view, in one of the few cases
extensively discussing the question-People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E.
945 (1915). M'Naghten's Case also took the view that "moral," not "legal," wrong
was the test, as it is there pointed out that actual knowledge of the law is no test,
the law being "administered on the principle that everyone must be taken conclu-
sively to know it." To the same effect, see WEIHOFE N, INSANITY AS A DENSE IN
CRIIxAL LAw 28, 40 (1933).
" State v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 376 (1867) ; State v. Cooper, 170 N. C. 719, 87
1951]
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Bearing in mind that it is (a) the moral, not the legal, wrong with
reference to (b) the particular act charged as a crime, which must be
understood by the defendant, the legal test for insanity may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant, at the time of the alleged offense, know
the nature and quality of his act and the natural consequences of it, and
knowing this, have the capacity to distinguish between what was morally
right and morally wrong with respect to that particular act?27 This is
the basic test.
The "Test" in Specific Conditions
Having considered the basic test for insanity, we can now turn to its
application to particular mental conditions. Here we have such condi-
tions as drunkenness, dipsomania, delirium tremens, drug addiction,
emotional insanity, low mentality, and the like. The temporary and
long-time effects of alcohol on mentality are so frequently encountered
that the application of the test in alcoholic conditions will now be con-
sidered. In many, if not most, homicides involving intoxication, the
investigating officers might immediately secure blood-tests for alcoholic
content from participants and thus take a great many of these cases out
of the realm of general speculation as to responsibility (more than .2 of
1% alcohol in the blood definitely affects the mind) ; however, there are
legal and practical difficulties preventing this to date and such scientific
information is rarely available to the courts.
28
Alcoholic Conditions
The horn-book generalization-"drunkenness is no excuse for
S. E. 50 (1915) ; State v. Journegan, 185 N. C. 700, 117 S. E. 27 (1923) ; State
v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 23 S. E. 2d 885 (1943) ; State v. Harris, 223 N. C.
697, 28 S. E. 2d 232 (1943) ; State v. Swink, 229 N. C. 123, 47 S. E. 2d 852 (1948).
"7 This statement of the rule, though somewhat more detailed, substantially fol-
lows the recent cases, such as State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 28 S. E. 2d 232
(1943), where a number of the authorities are reviewed. "Nature" is here used
to refer to the physical facts; as, for example, that he had a gun in his hand,
that the gun was loaded, that he had his finger on the trigger, etc. "Quality" is
used to denote the moral aspects of the act; as, for example, that human life has
dignity and is protected by society, that wounding or killing a human being is
morally wrong, etc. "Natural consequences" is used to couple the physical facts
and the moral aspects in terms of significance and meaning; as, for example, that
firing the gun at the deceased would wound or kill him, an act which is morally
wrong and for which he will be held to be morally accountable. Trial judges
wishing to amplify the traditional test to include, with greater fairness and scien-
tific accuracy, factors long advocated by critics such as Judge Somerville (see note
9), may, after giving the test above, add the following: "Or did the defendant,
even though you find that mental disease has weakened his power to choose be-
tween right and wrong, still possess sufficient will, as a free agent, to avoid the act
in question?" This would extend the traditional test of the "reasoning" insanities
to include the "volitional" insanities such as insane compulsions, obsessions, phobias,
etc. which may paralyze or destroy the will power.
28 See Inbau, Scientific Tests in Esidence, SYMPosIuM ON MEDICOLEGAL PROn-
LEms 226 (1948) ; INDAUr, SELF-INcRIMINATIoN 72 (1950) ; FoRREsTER, CHEMICAL
TzsTs FOR ALCOHOL N TRAFFic LAW ENFORCEMENT (1950).
[Vol. 30
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crime"29-is basically correct, but like most over-simplifications is none
too accurate. Certainly, this generalization is true where the specific
intention to commit the crime is formed first ard the intoxicants are
taken to "fortify" the criminal for the commission of the crime.
30 It
is also true, in part, with respect to crimes requiring no specific, criminal
intent, such as second-degree murder or manslaughter
3 1 or rape 32
(which do not require, in a legal sense, premeditation or deliberation)
or most of the lesser crimes. This class includes nearly all criminal
cases; the rule as to these may accurately be called the general rule in
criminal cases. In such cases drunkenness is a defense, but since the
state does not have to prove a specific intent, it is an affirmative defense
and the burden is upon the defendant to satisfy the jury that he was so
intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing and was so uncon-
scious of doing wrong that he was incapable of forming even the general
criminal intent.3 3 In such cases there is no specific mental element
which is a part of the definition of the crime and which the state, ac-
cordingly, has the burden of proving; it follows that the defendant must
go forward with proof satisfying the jury that he 'did not know what
he was doing or that it was wrong (otherwise the jury may assume
from the act itself that he was sane). In other words, the general pre-
sumption of sanity make the defendant responsible for his criminal acts,
unless the jury is satisfied that he was irresponsible.
3 4
However, in one class of cases drunkenness may be an "excuse" or
"defense" in a somewhat different sense. In charges of murder in the
first degree,36 or burglary,3 6 or probably felonious breaking and enter-
ing,37 all of which require a specific, criminal intent as a part of the
" State v. Sewell, 48 N. C. 245 (1855) ; State v. Keith, 83 N. C. 626 (1880);
State v. Alston, 210 N. C. 258, 186 S. E. 354 (1936).
" State v. McManus, 217 N. C. 445, 8 S. E. 2d 251 (1940) ; State v. Kale, 124
N. C. 816, 32 S. E. 892 (1899).
3' State v. Alston, 210 N. C. 258, 186 S. E. 354 (1936).
a' State v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 23 S. E. 2d 885 (1943) ; State v. Swink,
229 N. C. 123, 47 S. E. 2d 852 (1948).
"Ibid.; State v. Adams, 214 N. C. 501, 199 S. E. 716 (1938).
" State v. Cloninger, 149 N. C. 567, 63 S. E. 154 (1908) ; State v. Cuireton,
218 N. C. 491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940).
" State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. E. 1075 (1911) ; State v. Ross, 193
N. C. 25, 136 S. E. 193 (1927) ; State v. Alston, 210 N. C. 258, 186 S. E. 354
(1936) ; State v. Edwards, 211 N. C. 555, 191 S. E. 1 (1937).
20 State v. Allen, 186 N. C. 302, 119 S. E. 504 (1923).
'* State v. Spear, 164 N. C. 452, 79 S. E. 869 (1913) ; State v. Feyd, 213 N. C.
617, 197 S. E. 171 (1938) ; State v. Friddle, 223 N. C. 258, 25 S. E. 2d 751 (1943).
The most recent pronouncement on the subject is State v. Marsh, 234 N. C.
101, 66 S. E. 2d 684 (1951), one of the last opinions written by Stacy, C. J., and
adopted by the court after his death, involving charges of robbery with firearms
and murder. The judge told the jury, ". . . while the defendant has no burden
so far as establishing a lack of premeditation and deliberation-the State has the
burden of showing that beyond all reasonable doubt before it can obtain a verdict
of guilty of murder in the first degree-at the same time if the defendant has satis-
fied you that he did not have the mental capacity because of his drunkenness to
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
definition of the crime, the state must prove this intent as one of the
elements of the crime.37* In such cases where drunkenness has made
the formation of such an intent impossible, the state fails to prove an
essential part of the crime and the defendant is acquitted. In these cases
the state must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
had the necessary specific intent. In first degree murder, for example,
proof of drunkenness may negative deliberation and thus reduce the
crime from first degree murder to some lower degree of homicide.88
In these specific intent cases, as plainly indicated by the opinions in the
cases cited, it should be held for error if the judge requires the defendant
deliberate and premeditate, he could not be guilty of murder in the first degree."
This was approved; State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 21, 136 S. E. 193 (1927) ; State v.
Swink, 229 N. C. 123, 47 S. E. 2d 852 (1948) ; and State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697,
28 S. E. 2nd 232 (1943), were cited as in accord. This still leaves the rule in
doubt, as the burden was first placed on the state, then the defendant was required
to "satisfy" the jury. The Ross case placed the burden on the state as did the
Harris case, but the latter indicated that the presumption of sanity was such as to
require the defendant to "satisfy" the jury of his insanity; the Swink case involved
a rape charge, which requires no specific intent, and does not bear directly on the
problem. The Harris case makes it clear that the real problem is whether the
presumption of sanity instantly disappears when evidence of insanity is offered.
This is unsettled.
"a As Chief Justice Stacy quoted, with approval, from a Tennessee case in State
v. Allen, 186 N. C. 302, 309, 119 S. E. 504, 507 (1923) : "To regard the fact of
intoxication as meriting consideration in such a case [where a specific intent is part
of the crime] is not to hold that drunkenness will excuse crime, but to inquire
whether the very crime which the law defines and punishes has, in point of fact,
been committed." This view had already been fully discussed and approved in
State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. E. 1075 (1911), where Hoke, J., wrote that
the view that "voluntary drunkenness is no legal excuse for crime" does not "pre-
vail where, in addition to the overt act, it is required that a definite, specific intent
be established as an essential feature of the crime. In CLARK'S CaIiRi. LAw 72
(3d ed. 1915), this limitation is succinctly stated: "Where a specific intent is es-
sential to constitute crime, the fact of intoxication may negative its existence."
This was quoted with approval in State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 27, 136 S. E. 193,
194 (1927) ; and was again approved in State v. Alston, 210 N. C. 258, 261, 186
S. E. 354, 356 (1936), where it was stated as "well settled," and numerous North
Carolina cases were cited to support the statement. For authorities indicating that
this view is now "unsettled," see discussion in text under "Burden of Proof," infra.
For a discussion of the medical and legal problem, see Weihofen and Overholser,
Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959 (1947).
" State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. E. 1075 (1911) ; State v. Alston, 210
N. C. 258, 186 S. E. 354 (1936) ; State v. Edwards, 211 N. C. 555, 191 S. E. 1
(1937); State v. Absher, 226 N. C. 656, 40 S. E. 2d 26 (1946). These cases,
after the statute establishing degrees of murder, hold clearly that proof of drunken-
ness may "lower the grade of the crime" from first degree murder. Accordingly,
they modify and correct the contrary view in older cases; as, for example, State v.
Kale, 124 N. C. 816, 32 S. E. 892 (1899), where it is said in passing that drunken-
ness will neither repel the malice implied from the use of a deadly weapon (which
still seems not to have been challenged) nor "lower the grade of the crime" (which
was changed, but inay once more be the law). An example of the recent tendency
to return to the old rule, in spite of the murder statute, is State v. Cureton, 218
N. C. 491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940), a first degree murder case in which drunkenness
was treated as an affirmative defense and it was held that there was not evidence
enough to overcome the presumption of sanity. The practical effect of this view
is to raise a "presumption of specific intent," which would free the state of the
burden of proving specific intent.
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to satisfy the jury that he was so drunk that he was irresponsible, since
the state has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was sufficiently responsible to form the specific intent. Unfortunately
for the clarity of the law, there is another line of cases inconsistent with
this position. This problem is discussed later under "Burden of Proof."
To return to the particular matter under consideration-drunkenness
as a defense-the North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that, in
these specific intent cases, the right-from-wrong test serves a special and
limited purpose and should be applied in an appropriate way; for ex-
ample, in determining the effect of drunkenness on deliberation the test
is whether the defendant was "unable to think out beforehand what he
intended to do and to weigh it and understand the nature and conse-
quences of his act."3 9
Nearly a hundred years ago, delirium tremens, a violent form of
temporary mental disturbance brought on by excessive and prolonged
use of alcohol,40 was considered as a defense to crime.41  The delirium
had passed at the time of murder, but it was there declared that when
&1runkenness "is carried so far as to cause delirium tremens, any act
perpetrated under the delirium is excused, though the disease is but
temporary; and when continued so far as to dethrone reason altogether,
the presumption of law is removed; because the disease is then perma-
nent: the law looks only to the state of mind, and not to the cause pro-
ducing it." 4 1 In a later dipsomania murder this was approved.
4 2
"Dipsomania"' is an uncontrollable craving for alcoholic liquors, 43 and
is described by our court as an "insatiable thirst, intensified by long
indulgence" which is not recognized as a defense to crime.4 4 In what
appears to be the first case in our reports dealing with responsibility in
criminal law (murder of one slave by a drunken slave), the court
flatly refused to consider voluntary drunkenness as a defense, but sug-
gested that, possibly, where there was legal provocation, it might be
admitted to rebut malice; although this case was five years after
M'Naghtenis Case, the opinion did not indicate any awareness of that
" State v. Cureton, 218 N. C. 491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940). Substantially the
same test was approved in State v. Hammonds, 216 N. C. 67, 3 S. E. 439 (1939),
where Judge Burney had charged fully on the state's duty to show specific intent
and deliberation in first degree murder cases, saying "Where a specific intent is
essential to constitute crime, the fact of, intoxication may negative its existence,".
and if the defendant was "so drunk that he is utterly unable to form or entertain
this essential purpose, he should not be convicted... of murder in the first degree."
"' MALOY, MFricAL DIcrioNARY FOR LAWYERS 171 (2d ed. 1951).
"x State v. Sewell, 48 N. C. 245 (1855).
" Id. at 249.
"State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887).
"MALoY, MExtcAL DIcTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 182 (2d ed. 1951).
"State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 465, 6 S. E. 657 660 (1887).
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case and generally implied an extremely limited recognition of insanity
as a defense to crime.
45
"Alcoholism" is the condition produced by excessive or prolonged
use of alcoholic liquors; in its acute form it may be mere drunkenness,
but in its chronic form due to long-continued excess, it produces perma-
nent damage to the individual. 40  There is a popular tendency to dis-
regard mere drunkenness in fixing guilt for crimes, but chronic alco-
holism actually produces organic changes and deteriorations in the in-
dividual and necessarily affects the mental condition. This distinction,
fortunately, has been recognized by the courts. 4" Evidence that the
alcohol definitely affected the 'defendant at the time of the offense, and
that the deliberation had not previously taken place while sober, must
be quite clear; otherwise, the court will hold that there was not sufficient
evidence to go to the jury on the question of lack of sanity.4s Chronic
alcoholism, especially when connected with other factors affecting the
mind, has been recognized as a defense to crime. In one case, an ad-
vanced syphilitic and alcoholic, requested an instruction that if long-
continued use of alcohol or 'disease, or both, deprived him of his sanity
at the time of the offense, he would not be guilty; the court held that
he was entitled to this instruction.40 In another case, a former mor-
phine addict had been drinking before the offense; the trial judge in-
structed that if long use of liquor or drugs, or both, had destroyed his
sanity, he would not be guilty, and the court approved the charge.5 0 In
the last case the court merely declared there was "No error" adverse
to the defendant; appellate procedure provides no methed for deter-
mining errors of the judge favoring the defendant.
In dealing with drunkenness and crime, the temptation, on the part
of some (a few medical men and psychiatrists, for example), to regard
the condition unqualifiedly as a disease must be checked. An uncriti-
"' State v. John, 30 N. C. 330 (1848). Twelve years after M'Naghtcles
Case, the opinion in a later case on the question showed no familiarity with the
M'Naghten rule. State v. Sewell, 48 N. C. 245 (1855). Nearly twenty years after
M'Nagbten, that case was still not cited, although this 1862 opinion presented the
first clean-cut statement of the right-from-wrong test in our reports. State v.
Brandon, 53 N. C. 463 (1861). Finally, nearly a quarter of a century after
M'Naghten, Judge George Green's charge to the jury, an excellent synthesis of
the M'Naghten rule, was commended by Pearson, C. J., in State v. Haywood, 61
N. C. 376 (1867), as a model to the other trial judges. That charge is still the
accepted pattern in North Carolina.
' MALOY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 26 (2d ed. 1951).
' State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887) ; State v. Sewell, 48 N. C.
245 (1855). See cases cited in notes 48-50, infra.
48 State v. English, 164 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 72 (1913) ; State v. Shelton, 164
N. C. 513, 79 S. E. 883 (1913).
"State v. Lee, 196 N. C. 714, 146 S. E. 858 (1929).
= State v. English, 164 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 72 (1913). In State v. Rippy, 104
N. C. 752, 10 S. E. 259 (1889), the judge failed to charge on the effect of an over-
dose of morphine as affecting responsibility; this was held to be error.
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cal and indiscriminate application of this conception could all but destroy
the basic and fundamental doctrine of legal responsibility. "For forensic
purposes, alcoholism is not a sickness but a bad habit," although, "of
course it may strip the offense of some element, such as wilfulness, pre-
meditation or deliberation, and thus reduce the degree of the crime."5 0'
Conditions Not Constituting a Defense
Like most legal definitions, the statement of the right-from-wrong
test is as important for what it does not say as for what it says. It
excludes many mental conditions from consideration as a defense. One
of the fullest of the early statements of the rule was made by Justice
Manly: "The law does not recognize any moral power compelling one
to do what he knows is wrong. 'To know the right and still the wrong
pursue' proceeds from a perverse will brought about by the seductions
of the evil one, but which nevertheless, with the aids that lie within our
reach, as we are taught to believe, may be resisted and overcome, other-
wise it would not seem to be consistent with the principles of justice to
punish any malefactor. There are many appetites and passions which
by long indulgence acquire a mastery over men more or less strong.
Some persons indeed deem themselves incapable of exerting strength of
will sufficient to arrest their rule, speak of them as irresistible, and
impotently continue under their dominion; but the law is far from ex-
cusing criminal acts committed under the impulse of such passions....
If the prisoner knew that what he did was wrong, the law presumes
that he had the power to resist it, against all supernatural agencies, and
holds him amenable to punishment."51  This rule clearly assumes: (1)
That man has complete freedom-of-will, (2) that intelligence dominates
and controls both emotion and will, (3) that no appetite or passion,
however great, is too strong for the individual to control. With one
or more of these assumptions, many scientific men are inclined to dis-
agree, but our entire structure of criminal law administration is raised
upon them. In fact, it is 'difficult to see how an orderly ociety could
be maintained without these or similar assumptions as to individual
responsibility.
o Davidson, The Psychiatric Role in the. Administration of Criminal Justice,
4 RuTGERS L. REv. 578 (1950). For a medical man, Dr. Davidson's understanding,
and appreciation, of the legal function is profound, exceptional and refreshing.
In North Carolina "he who knows the right and still the wrong pursues is ame-
nable to the criminal law,"--Stacy, C. J., in State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 704,
28 S. E. 2d 232, 238 (1943), approving a quotation given earlier by Manly, J.,
in State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463, 467 (1861). Our law recognizes the distinction
between voluntary dunkenness, which is no excuse, and dethronement of reason,
which is an excuse. State v. Hammonds, 216 N. C. 67, 3 S. E. 2d 439 (1939).
It also recognizes the distinction between temporary drunkenness, which may not
be an excuse, and chronic alcoholism producing irresponsibility, which is a defense
to murder. State v. Lee, 196 N. C. 714, 146, S. E. 858 (1929).
"' State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463, 467-8 (1861).
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There have been many vague, descriptive terms used in our cases
with reference to mental conditions which do not constitute a defense
to crime. Their meanings are not always precise, but they are helpful
in suggesting the general, outside limits of the legal definition of insanity.
It has been said that "moral or emotional" insanity is no defense to
murder.5 2 This, apparentiy, means merely that defects of intelligence
only determine insanity, and that no 'defects of the moral or emotional
life can affect legal responsibility. The same case declared that "un-
controllable impulse" is no defense to crime; this idea, in the more
generally used expression "irresistible impulse," is an extension of the
right-from-wrong test and has been recognized as a defense in some
states. 53 "A temporary lapse of moral perception" is no defense to
crime, but might be used to show want of deliberation;54 a plea of
"temporary insanity" has actually been used in this state to reduce
murder to second degree. 55 Neither a "weak mind"' 56 nor a "low men-
tality" 57 are defenses to crime unless there is an inability to distinguish
right from wrong. However, if there is a lack of capacity to distinguish
right from wrong on only one subject (sometimes called monomania)
and the offense charged relates to that subject, this is a valid defense to
crime.58
Evidence of Mental Incapacity
Anyone who has known a defendant, and formed an opinion of his
mental condition, may testify to his mental capacity, even though the
witness is not an expert.59 If the witness is accepted by the trial judge
as a medical or psychiatric expert,60 even though he has no personal
knowledge of defendant, he may give his opinion based upon the eviden-
tiary observations of others as reflected in hypothetical questions.0 1
2 State v. Terry, 173 N. C. 761, 92 S. E. 154 (1917). See State v. Green, 152
N. C. 835, 68 S. E. 16 (1910), in which the husband claimed a "brainstorm" caused
him to kill his wife's paramour, and the jury reduced the offense to second degree
murder.
" The term "irresistible impulse" is more commonly used. The states recog-
nizing this defense are listed, with case citations, in GLUECK, MENTAL DIsonnn
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 267-273 (1925).
" State v. Farrell, 223 N., C. 804, 28 5. E. 2d 560 (1944). See State v. Green,
152 N. C. 835, 68 S. E. 16 (1910).
• State v. Green, 152 N. C. 835, 68 S. E. 16 (1910).
"State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 475 (1903).
" State v. Jenkins, 208 N. C. 740, 182 S. E. 324 (1935) ; State v. Bracy, 215
N. C. 248, 1 S. E. 2d 891 (1939).
"' State v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 23 S. E. 2d 885 (1943).
" State v. Keaton, 205 N. C. 607, 172 S. E. 179 (1934) ; State v. Witherspoon,
210 N. C. 647, 188 S. E. 111 (1936).
"1 State v. Coombs, 200 N. C. 671, 158 S. E. 252 (1931) ; State v. Smith, 223
N. C. 457, 27 S. E. 2d 114 (1943) ; State v. Peterson, 225 N. C. 540, 35 S. E. 2d
645 (1945).
"State v. Dilliard, 223 N. C. 446, 27 S. E. 2d 85 (1943). For a more detailed
discussion, see STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EvID'cE 268-273 (1946) and 2
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These are the two basic rules governing evidence of mental capacity.
Customarily, the non-expert testifies to whether the defendant was
"insane" or "knew right from wrong."62  In addition to those lay wit-
nesses who knew defendant before the offense, a sheriff0 3 or a superin-
tendent of an asylum,6 4 who had defendant in custody after the offense,
may testify to his mental condition. Of course, the defendant himself
may testify; for example, that certain injuries had affected his mind.65
A non-expert may testify that defendant knew it was "wrong to shoot
a man down"66 and has even been permitted to say that defendant was
mentally sound and capable of premeditation ;67 but he may not give an
opinion of defendant's mental capacity to commit the particular crime
charged, as this is the specific question to be decided and an opinion
upon it would invade the province of the jury.68 Further, a non-expert
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §672 (3d ed. 1940). For criticisms of the hypothetical ques-
tion from the medical point of view, see White, Expert Testimony in Criminal
Proceedings Invoking the Question of the Mental State of the Defendant, 11 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 499 (1921), and Briggs, Medico-Legal Insanity and the
Hypothetical Question, 14 J. Calm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 62 (1923). For medical
criticism of the right-from-wrong test itself, see Meagher, Crime and Insanity:
The Legal as Opposed to the Medical View, and the Most Commonly Asserted
Pleas, 14 J. OF CRIm. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1923), and Note, 72 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 167 (1924), citing both medical and legal authorities. See note 6 supra.
" State v. Stefanoff, 206 N. C. 443, 174 S. E. 411 (1934) ; State v. Keaton, 205
N. C. 607, 172 S. E. 179 (1934); State v. Jones, 203 N. C. 374, 166 S. E. 163
(1932); State v. Cooper, 170 N. C. 719, 87 S. E. 50 (1915) ; State v. Coley, 114
N. C. 879, 19 S. E. 705 (1894).
" State v. Cooper, 170 N. C. 719, 87 S. E. 50 (1915).
O" State v. Pritchett, 106 N. C. 667, 11 S. E. 357 (1890).
o State v. Nall, 211 N. C. 61, 188 S. E. 637 (1936).
"' State v. Banner, 149 N. C. 519, 63 S. E. 84 (1908).
17 Such testimony was permitted in State v. Home, 209 N. C. 725, 184 S. E.
470 (1936), although the witness is not directly quoted in the opinion. As we
would expect, an opposite opinion has also been allowed; in State v. Nail, 211
N. C. 61, 188 S. E. 637 (1936), the witness was permitted to express the opinion
that defendant "was not mentally competent, but was irresponsible"' If the rule
relating to the "invasion of the province of the jury," discussed under note 68
infra, is sound, these two cases are of doubtful soundness unless strictly interpreted
and narrowly applied. Contra the view of these cases, see State v. Hauser, 202
N. C. 738, 164 S. E. 114 (1932), and note 68 infra.
" This is the view of State v. Hauser, 202 N. C. 738, 164 S. E. 114 (1932),
which held it error to allow a non-expert to testify that defendant had "sufficient
mental capacity to plan a murder and then carry it into execution," and of State v.
Journegan, 185 N. C. 700, 117 S. E. 27 (1923), in which the court sustained ex-
clusion of testimony that defendant had "sufficient mental capacity to operate a still
and to know it was wrong." Many other supporting local authorities are collected
in STANSBERY, NORTH CAROLINA EvmIcE §126 (1946), where this rule is sub-
jected to sharp criticism and where it is pointed out that it has been attacked by the
late Justice Hoke (Marshall v. Telephone Co., 181 N. C. 292, 106 S. E. 818 (1921))
and by Justice Devin (Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N. C. 1, 21 S. E. 2d 818 (1942)),
by former U. N. C. Law Dean Charles T. McCormick (Book Review, 37 ILL. L.
REV. 462 (1943)), by Harvard Professor Edmund Morgan (Book Review, 29 VA.
L. REv. 970 (1943)), by the late Dean Wigmore" (EVIDENCE §1920 (3d ed. 1940)),
and in a note in 16 N. C. L. REV. 180 (1938). The reader is entitled to know my
view. Those who are familiar with my article, The Camera Goes to Court, 24
N. C. L. REV. 233 (1946) know that I am an advocate of admitting all reliable evi-
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
may not be questioned concerning the defendant's "general reputation"
for sanity, as this is not a subject properly proved by reputation
evidence. 69
"Hereditary insanity" has also been mentioned in the cases; to be
competent evidence it must be: (1) Notorious, (2) of the same species
of insanity as defendant's, and (3) not temporary. Of course, this type
of evidence must meet the usual rules of relevancy.o9a
Pleading Insanity
Insanity may be pertinent in either of two aspects: (1) Insanity at
the time of the offense (this is the general problem which we have been
discussing) and (2) insanity at the time of trial. The first deals with
legal responsibility for the act itself and, consequently, is a problem of
guilt or innocence; the latter relates to the capacity of the defendant to
conduct his defense and, accordingly, is a preliminary problem relating
to postponement of trial of the question of guilt or innocence. Since
the latter is simpler, less important and less recurrent, it will be dis-
cussed first.
In the first place, "present insanity" must be specially pleaded; if
it is not pleaded, the judge need not pass upon it nor submit it to the
jury.70 When such a plea is entered, the court has said that the proper
procedure is to try this preliminary question before a jury and dispose
of it in advance of the jury trial of the case on its merits.71 This still
commends itself as the more orderly and less confusing method of dis-
posing of the matter. However, in one case, after the trial on the merits
had been begun, the plea was amended to suggest "present insanity"
and the trial judge submitted both issues to the jury; the court decided
that the defendant waived the objection and since it was not shown
that the efendant was prejudiced by such handling, there was no erro
dence which will help the jury reach the true facts. Accordingly, I think the
"invasion of the jury" rule should be abandoned. Jurors, in their daily lives,
evaluate and act upon opinion, expert and non-expert, constantly. Why should they
not follow, as jurors, the same guides they have found dependable in their personal
affairs? Jurors pass on the weight and credibility of conflicting evidence of fact;
are they not equally qualified to evaluate conflicting opinions?
o State v. Coley, 114 N. C. 879, 19 S. E. 705 (1894).
State v. Christmas, 51 N. C. 471 (1859); State v. Cunningham, 72 N. C.
469 (1875). Naturally, such evidence cannot be presented until there is proof of
defendant's own insanity. Similarly, where there has been no proof that defendant
was drinking, evidence that he was "wild" when drinking, was not admissible.
State v. Alexander, 179 N. C. 759, 103 S. E. 383 (1920). For like reason, when
insanity is a defense, it cannot be shown that deceased was a "dangerous and vio-
lent man," nor that he had been armed and lying in wait for defendant. State v.
Banner, 149 N. C. 519, 63 S. E. 84 (1908). Nor can it be shown that the infidelity
of the wife, reported to defendant, was true. State v. Green, 152 N. C. 835, 68 S. E.
16 (1910).'o State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 475 (1903).
" State v. Haywood, 94 N. C. 847 (1886).
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in the trial.72 In a recent case, the opinion implies that when present
insanity is pleaded the trial judge should halt the trial of the offense
and try this issue first, but in that case the judge submitted both "present
insanity" and "insanity at the time of the offense" to the jury at the
same time, and no error was found. 78 Accordingly, the present state
of the law is that the proper procedure is to try the question of present
insanity first, but if the trial judge submits both issues to the same jury
at the same time, the North Carolina Supreme Court will not disturb
the result.
The general plea of "not guilty" is broad enough to cover an admis-
sion of the act but tienial of guilt on the ground of insanity.74 A formal
plea, apparently, is sometimes made,75 and when so made the effect is
to admit the act but deny responsibility for it.76 The safer practice is to
offer the formal plea of "not guilty on the ground of insanity"; in one
case there was evidence that the defendant was "crazy" after a blow on
his head, but the court declared that there was "no evidence that the
defendant \vas not capable" and the judge was not required to charge
the jury on insanity.
77
Degree of Proof
Where the burden is upon the state to show sanity in making out
the offense, the proof must be "beyond a reasonable doubt" ;78 normally,
the burden is upon the defendant and his is a lesser burden-"to the
satisfaction of the jury."79 In one of the cases the trial judge correctly
charged that defendant must prove insanity "to the satisfaction of the
jury," but at one place, by a lapsus linguae, suggested that insanity must
be "clearly proven"; the court did not think the jury was confused by
this.8 0 In a latek case, the judge required that insanity be "clearly
proved," without correcting this; the court promptly held it to be error.8 '
Presumption and Burden of Proof
The average, normal individual knows what he is doing and is held
responsible for his acts. This psychological norm has been recognized
7 State v. Sandlin, 156 N. C. 624, 72 S. E. 203 (1911).
State v. Sullivan, 229 N. C. 251, 49 S. E. 2d 458 (1948).
7, State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887).
' State v. Melvin, 219 N. C. 538, 14 S. E. 2d 538 (1941).
' State v. Bowser, 214 N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938).
7 State v. Miller, 219 N. C. 514, 14 S. E. 2d 522 (1941).
See text infra, "Presumptions and Burden of Proof."
" State v. Cash, 219 N. C. 818, 15 S. E. 2d 277 (1941) ; State v. Cureton, 218
N. C. 491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940) ; State v. Payne, 86 N. C. 609 (1882) ; State
v. Willis, 63 N. C. 26 (1868).
" State v. Manning, 221 N. C. 70, 18 S. E. 2d 821 (1942).
8 State v. Swink, 229 N. C. 123,'47 S. E. 2d 852 (1948). In State v. Payne,
86 N. C. 609 (1882), the court held "preponderance of the evidence" wrong but,
as it is a lighter burden of proof than "satisfaction of the jury," such a charge is
not prejudicial and will not be reversed.
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by the courts and has given rise to the presumption that every man is
sane and possesses sufficient reason to be responsible; if he asserts the
contrary, the burden is upon him to show it.82 In such cases, the state
may rely (1) on this presumption of sanity, or (2) on testimony of
witnesses, or (3) on both.83  There is one class of cases, as we noted
earlier,8 4 which may constitute an exception to this general rule: Where
the definition of the crime includes a specific mental element, the state,
in proving this crime, must prove the mental element beyond a reason-
able doubt.8 5 It would seem to be elementary logic that where a par-
ticular mental element is an essential part of the crime and the state has
the burden of proving the whole crime, beyond a reasonable doubt, it
has not succeeded until it has proved the required mental element. The
many cases which hold that evidence of drunkenness is admissible "in
mitigation" of deliberation in first degree murder cases are authority
for this position, since they recognize that such evidence by the de-
fendant is an effort to weaken or "mitigate" the case which the state has
the burden of proving. However, the rules which are applicable in the
non-specific intent cases (where intent is presumed from the act itself)
appaiently, at times, have influenced the result in specific intent cases
(where the state has the burden of proving intent).80 The cases before
the enactment of the statute dividing murder into degrees did not make
8State v. Cloninger, 149 N. C. 567, 63 S. E. 154 (1908); State v. Cureton,
218 N. C. 491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940). Neither is malice rebutted by proof of
drunkenness. State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 451, 6 S. E. 657 (1887).
State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 28 S. E. 2d 232 (1943).
s, See text supra "Alcoholic Conditions."
' In addition to the cases cited under the heading "Alcoholic Conditions," see
specifically the following: State v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 23 S. E. 2d 885 (1943),
'a rape case which correctly places the burden on defendant, but specifically recog-
nizes that the rule is different in first degree murder. Justice Barnhill in his dis-
sent in State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d 348 (1949), collects a large
number of our cases to the effect that evidence of drunkenness is in mitigation of
deliberation, which the state has the burden of proving, a view vigorously stated
by Hoke, J., in State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. E. 1075 (1911), and approved
in State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72 (1913) ; State v. Allen, 186 N. C.
302, 119 S. E. 504 (1923) ; State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 136 S. E. 193 (1927).
8 For example, compare the language in State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51
S. E. 2d 348 (1949), State v. Bracy, 215 N. C. 248, 1 S. E. 2d 891 (1939), and
State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887), with the rule of Justice Hoke
in State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. E. 1075 (1911), and the later cases fol-
lowing it, cited in note 85 supra. The language in State v. Cureton, 218 N. C.
491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940), too, could, be troublesome, but the result is completely
consistent with such cases as State v. Shelton, 164 N. C. 513, 79 S. E. 883 (1913),
where it was held that there was no substantial evidence of lack of mental capacity
requiring its submission to the jury. This question of submission, of course, can
arise under either the Murphy rule or the Creech rule, though, perhaps, less evi-
dence would be considered necessary to "raise a reasonable doubt" than would be
required to "satisfy the jury." Actually, State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 451, 6 S. E. 657
(1887), as well as State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481 (1883) and State v. Payne, 86
N. C. 699 (1882), is merely authority for the position that before our statute
created first degree murder as a separate offense with a specific intent, the burden
of proving legal incapacity rested on the defendant.
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any distinction as to the burden, but after the statutory change the bur-
den of proving deliberation was placed squarely on the state.8 7 After
the statute, the burden continued to be on the defendant in second degree
murder cases (as in all other non-specific intent cases),88 but not in first
degree murder where the state must prove deliberation.8 9  Unfortu-
nately, some cases after the statute, relying on the old cases, continued
the old rule without modification even in first degree murder cases. 90
Thus, we have two lines of authority as to where the burden of proving
the mental element rests in first degree murder cases. There is little
wonder that a recent case brought sharply in focus the conflict between
the two rules, the majority view sustaining the unmodified rule and
placing the burden of showing the lack of deliberation on the defendant. 91
Thus, the present rule in all criminal cases may be stated in the words of
Clark, C. J., "... the burden of proving insanity in a criminal case is
on the defendant who sets it up."
'9 2
As we have noted, this burden placed on the defendant to prove
insanity is based upon the presumption that everyone is sane. Accord-
ingly, in cases where insanity is a defense, the jury is told that the
defendant is presumed to be innocent and the state must prove him
guilty, but that he is also presumed to be sane and legally responsible
for his acts, if he does not prove the contrary. To what extent, if any,
this counter-presumption of sanity confuses the jury, or weakens the
effect of the traditional presumption of innocence, we have no means
of knowing.
"' After the statute dividing murder into degrees, the first murder case involving
the mental element was State v. McDaniel, 115 N. C. 807, 20 S. E. 622 (1894) ;
it was there said that it was "too well settled to require discussion" that if the
evidence "raises a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant formed a deliberate,
premeditated design to kill" he cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree.
WHARTON, HOMIciE, was cited to support this position. See WHARTON, HOMI-
cmE 811-814 (3d ed. 1907) ; 2 WARRE, HOmICIDE 201-204 (Perm. ed. 1938), citing
a number of North Carolina cases, such as State v. Bishop, 131 N. C. 733, 42 S. E.
839 (1902) ; State v. Foster, 172 N. C. 960, 90 S. E. 785 (1916), State v. Roberson,
150 N. C. 837, 64 S. E. 182 (1909). State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 136 S. E. 193
(1927), a first degree murder case, and State v. Allen, 186 N. C. 302, 119 S. E.
504 (1923), a first degree burglary case, followed with approval the McDaniel and
Murphy view.
80 State v. English, 164 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 72 (1913).
o See note 87 supra.
00 State v. Terry, 173 N. C. 761, 92 S. E. 154 (1917) ; State v. Jones, 191 N. C.
753, 133 S. E. 81 (1926) ; State v. Bracy, 215 N. C. 248, 1 S. E. 2d 891 (1939) ;
State v. Cureton, 218 N. C. 491, 11 S. E. 2d 469 (1940). State v. Jones supra, also
held that proof by defendant of previous insanity plus the presumption that in-
sanity continues constitutes a prima facie case of insanity, but does not relieve
the defendant of the burden of satisfying the jury.
" State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d 348 (1949).
02 State v. Hancock, 151 N. C. 699, 701, 66 S. E. 137, 138 (1909). This was an
embezzlement case in which the trial judge had placed the burden on the state to
show mental capacity, but Clark, C. J., went to some pains to correct this view.
Thus, embezzlement is treated as a non-specific intent crime.
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If this survey of the substantive and procedural law of insanity as a
defense has revealed both ambiguities and shortcomings in the present
law, we need not conclude that this jurisdiction is backvard in this field.
On the contrary, a rather extended examination of the authorities sug-
gests that the state of the law here is fairly typical. The need for sympa-
thetic understanding and co-operation between the legal and medical
professions is not confined to North Carolina, nor is it limited to this
particular subject. This tendency of law and medicine to clash is un-
fortunate but understandable. Each profession has its history, tradi-
tions, usages, langauge, techniques, concepts and viewpoints. The law-
yer and doctor each moves with pride and confidence within the pattern
of his own professional mores. Few men in either of the professions
are so well grounded in both law and medicine (even if they had the
time and inclination) as to be able to act as interpreters and co-ordina-
tors of the contributions of both professions for the common good.
9 3
This is one of the penalties inflicted upon a society dedicated to an ever-
increasing specialization in its quest for knowledge. Our knowledge
grows vertically without spreading horizontally. As the circumference
of man's knowledge increases, the area of contact with the vast space
of ignorance also increases. There is a humility of knowledge. The
more we know, the more we know that we do not know. The growing
knowledge of the specialist draws him ever farther away from other
specialists-and the common man. Man's learning has grown too vast
for this age to hope to produce a Benjamin Franklin9 4 or a Leonardo
-da Vinci, 95 but it is imperative that specialties such as law and medicine,
both dealing with the complex and social animal called man and having
many points of contact, produce courageous figures who will undertake
" So great has specialization become that medical men, as a matter of course,
refer mental questions to neuropsychiatrists, and many lawyers frankly confess
that they know little or nothing of the law of insaiiity. ". . . in general, our
lawyers may graduate from law school and attain membership at the bar ... and
become members of the bench, without being required to understand sufficiently
the difference between a mentally ill person and a sane person in a civil or criminal
case." Costerella, Mental Illness and the Law, 3 LAWYER AND LAW NoTs 2 (Fall,
1949). One of the minor, but very real, difficulties is that lawyers and doctors
have trouble escaping from their vocabularies. Both professions need to take to
heart the wisdom of Lord Thring in commenting upon Walter Bagehot, "I always
think that a man is master of his art in proportion as he can dispense with its
jargon."
"The range of Franklin's thought is indicated by his extensive writings; a
busy career in diplomacy; the experiments with lightning; the invention of bifocal
spectacles; his pioneering in such fields as police organization, fire protection, in-
surance, public libraries, and higher education-and an amazing variety of other
accomplishments not so well known.
"Leonardo da Vinci, whose fame could have rested either on his sculpture or
his painting, was known to his contemporaries largely for his engineering and
architecture. His inventions were numerous; his studies of physiology and anatomy
were extensive and significant; and, to the end, he was a "most profound investi-
gator into all the known branches of science of his age."
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to advance the cross-pollination and cross-fertilization of these related
specialties. Unless we soon enter upon the "Age of the Synthesizers,"
our learning appears doomed to become narrower and narrower as it
becomes deeper and deeper. The isolated and disparate bodies of learn-
ing must be brought closer together for the benefit of all, lest the common
man be imprisoned in a vale of ignorance by the host of lofty crags of
specialized learning encircling him. Our factual stockpile is growing
without a proportionate gain in general understanding. Learned men
build up footnotes, but the common man does not acquire wisdom. This
modest survey, in one small sector of the learning of the two professions,
grew out of an awareness of these problems of specialization and is an
effort to draw law and medicine closer together in one of the many
typical fields where the public good would benefit from a greater unity
of thought and effort.*
The Special Committee on Crime and Psychiatry of the North Caro-
lina Bar Association for 1951 was composed of Robert E. Lee, Wake
Forest; Frank C. Patton, Morganton; Clyde E. Gooch, Salisbury; Nor-
man Shepard, Smithfield; Basil L. Whitener, Gastonia; and Dillard S.
Gardner, Chairman, Raleigh. The Committee reported to the Sedge-
field meeting, June 14-16, 1951. The following recommendations (based
in part upon the foregoing article) were made, Mr. Whitener dissenting
from the first, third and fourth recommendations:
First. The presently accepted legal test of insanity-the capacity to
distinguish right from wrong-is an adequate test of mental disease af-
fecting the reasoning faculties, but it should be extended to include dis-
eases whiph destroy will-power and volition and the capacity to control
one's conduct. Many hospitalized insane can distinguish right from
wrong, but what renders them socially irresponsible is their lack of
power to control their conduct along rational lines. What the criminal
law should punish is not insane reasoning, but insane conduct, the doing
of the wrong by one having the power to do the right. A charge em-
bodying such an extension of the present test is given in the above
article. As this test is more favorable to the -defendant than the present
right-from-wrong test, it may be given to juries without enabling legis-
lation, but the compulsory use of the test would require legislation. Such
legislation is recommended.
*After completing this paper, there came to my desk the May '51 issue of
Texas Law Review, which at p. 611 contains "Science, Experts and the Courts"
by Charles T. McCormick, formerly Dean of the Law Schools of the University
of Texas and of the University of North Carolina, and certainly one of the ablest
critics of the law of evidence in the United States. I happily note his agreement
with many of the conclusions I have ventured here; particularly realistic are his
appraisals of the shortcomings of the right-from-wrong test and of the hypotheti-
cal question, both of which my former teacher would eliminate in favor of more
modern and more scientific techniques.
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Second. The partisan character of conflicting experts, when insanity
is at issue, has done much to discredit expert testimony and to deprive
juries of sound psychiatric advice and aid; this could be improved by the
court-appointment of experts (as is done now when receivers are named)
or by the judge (at the time of the plea) ordering the defendant to a
state hospital for a period of observation and a report from the superin-
tendent at the time of the trial (the superintendent to be subject to
examination and cross-examination). Trial judges, perhaps, have in-
herent power "in the interest of justice" to name experts to be called
by the court or to order defendants to state hospitals for observation,
but to set at rest any doubts on this point, enabling legislation to this
effect is recommended.
Third. In all crimes which are defined to include a specific mental
element (as, for example, "deliberation" in first degree murder), when
there is evidence that the defendant was insane or under the influence
of alcohol or narcotics, the burden of proving the existence of the neces-
sary mental element shall be upon the State. This was previously the
law (and may still be the law), but there are cases which cast doubt
upon this former right of the defendant. Legislation which would
eliminate this doubt is recommended. Such legislation would not dis-
turb the present rule in ordinary criminal cases, where criminal intent
is presumed from the act itself and the burden is upon the defendant to
prove, to the satisfaction of the jury, that he lacked the mental capacity
to commit the crime.
Fourth. In all cases, where lack of the mental element is a defense,
all witnesses, expert and non-expert, who have observed defendant, may
describe his mental condition and give an opinion concerning his mental
condition, including an opinion as to his capacity to commit the particular
crime charged. This is the rule at present, except that there is case
authority which prohibits an opinion as to the capacity to commit the
particular crime on the ground that such opinion invades the province
of the jury, and there is also case authority which permits such opinions.
A clarifying act would eliminate the present confusion, leaving the
jury to pass upon witnesses' opinions and to give to them such credit
and weight as the jury think they deserve. Such an act is recommended.
The report was referred to the new Committee for further study.
Mr. Kingsland Van Winkle, of Asheville, is the Chairman of the new
Committee which is continuing the study of this subject. This Com-
mittee's Report to the North Carolina Bar Association will be due in
the summer of 1952.
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